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GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR.*
This symposium revisits basic questions that the legal profession
has faced in the past, and which it must continue to face in the future.
Indeed, the legal profession-or any other group-may define itself by
the questions that it asks about itself. In this connection, the quality of
answers is usually a function of the quality of questions. Hence, the
legal profession is well defined in proportion as the questions about it-
self are coherent and well directed. This symposium invites attention
to the adequacy and focus of the questions that the profession has asked.
Certainly one question that must be considered is the notion of
professional competence. Professor Trakman suggests the search for
an acceptable definition has not been rewarding, but that the search
must continue. His assessment of the importance of the question is
reflected in the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for the
Model Rules put the matter of competence in first place among ethical
questions. The premise of the Rules is that if the lawyer does not
possess competence, performance of all other professional obliga-
tions-to the client, to the courts, to third persons-is necessarily in
jeopardy. The pervasiveness and depth of the problem of competence
are also suggested by Professor Blair and Judge Aldisert. Hence, the
Model Rules seem correct in giving salience to the question of com-
petence.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Model Rules do not go
far toward defining competence. To be sure, they represent an im-
provement on the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.1
of the Model Rules requires "reasonable competence." The Code
asserts as an aspiration that lawyers be competent, but in its black letter
establishes a standard that is not discernably different from gross
negligence. Thus, DR 6-101(A) makes it a violation of the standard of
competence only if the lawyer "knows or should know" that he is not
competent to handle the matter in question. But the proposed Model
Rules still state the standard in very general term; greater parti-
cularization proved unfeasible. There were objections that further
specification would imply a requirement of specialization and that a
requirement of specialization would impugn the competence of the gen-
eral practitioner. Underlying this objection, moreover, was a substan-
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tive proposition that could not be seriously disputed: Many general
practitioners can do a better job with any legal problem, even one of a
type they have never dealt with before, than many "specialists,"
however long may be the latter's experience and however extensive
their formal training.
This is another way of saying that certain characteristics of in-
telligence, insight, purposiveness, imagination, and perhaps tempera-
ment are more important in all legal tasks than is any particular body
of technical legal knowledge. If that is true, then professional com-
petence in law practice is essentially a manifestation of personal com-
petence in dealing with the affairs of adult life. Perhaps we would pro-
fit from considering the implications of that possibility.
One implication is the importance of the enforcement apparatus. If
"competence" is a complex but nontechnical attribute, then its ex-
istence must, like beauty, lie largely in the eye of the beholder. Or, to
vary the dictum as to which Justice Potter Stewart is most chagrined,
we may not be able to define incompetence but "we know it when we
see it." The crucial element in this formulation, of course, is the com-
position of "we." Is it "we" appellate judges, like Chief Justice Burger,
Judge Aldisert, and Justice Todd? Or panels of lawyers and laymen
constituted on a state-wide basis, along the line of development ex-
plored by Ms. Gray and Mr. Harrison? Or the members of federal agen-
cies, as Mssrs. Block and Harris warn us may be emanent? I forecast
that once the notion of enforcement of professional standards is taken
seriously, as has come to be the case, there will be a lot more con-
troversy over the constitution and province of disciplinary tribunals
having jurisdiction over lawyers.
The composition of the tribunals will be important not only in
issues directly involving competence, but also in issues where compet-
ence is indirectly involved. Competence is indirectly involved in pro-
fessional ethics to a far greater degree than may af first be apparent,
for a standard of competence is implicit in ethical rules that specify an
element of knowledge. For example, the rule that a lawyer shall not
"counsel or assist" a client in crime or fraud requires that the lawyer
know that an unfolding transaction may indeed involve crime or fraud.1
The rule that a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed of the
matter in his custody requires a lawyer to recognize significant events
when they occur;2 .and so on. But what standard of perceptivity is
1. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A) (7); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(d).
2. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC7-8, 9-2; MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.4.
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superimposed in deciding whether the lawyer must have know the por-
tent of unfolding events.?
Beyond the search for a mutually intelligible concept of com-
petence is a search for mutually intelligible concepts of professional
morality. That search goes beyond the drafting of rules of Mssrs. Arm-
strong and Kutak and myself are well aware, for we have been
variously engaged in writing such rules.
One concept of professional morality assumes that the adversary
system entails a dynamic equilibrium as a result of which all will be
well enough. That is, the legal system will be reasonably just, in its
process and in its outcomes, if people are enabled to be self-servingly
contentious, with the aid of energetic advocates, both in court and out
of court, subject only to the restraint of law of crime and fraud. The
logic of this justification essentially parallels the justification of
market economics, and underlies both the present Code of Professional
Responsibility and the proposed Model Rules of Professional conduct.
A rather different view pervaded the old Canons of Ethics. This view
was that lawyers were in some ill-defined way custodians of the law,
and therefore subject to constraints more confining than those imposed
by law on the population at large. That opinion is now quiescent if not
dead, but it will undoubtedly revive sooner or later. For there remain
those who doubt, even if quietly, that a society can hold together
primarily through the dynamics of conflict. An era of lawgiving, as
distinct from lawtaking, may be ahead.
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